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INTRODUCTION
Justice, exercised through institutions, which are
inevitable, must always be held in check by the initial
interpersonal relation.1
Individuals who have lost everything—their homes, jobs, and
dignity—are often forced to live on the street. Those with no reasonable
alternative can find themselves relying on the generosity of others just to
survive. In response, citizens petition, legislatures enact, and officers
enforce laws that criminalize signs of visible poverty. Municipalities have
made considerable attempts to remove visible poverty from their cities by
drafting legislation that disproportionately punishes people experiencing
homelessness.2 This Note focuses on a particular subset of such
legislation, laws that criminalize panhandling.3
Panhandling is one individual asking another individual for help,4 an
act which is a constitutionally protected form of speech.5 Courts have held
panhandling is a fundamental act of expression, deserving the highest
protections the First Amendment offers.6 Indeed, restrictions on
panhandling put at stake “the right to engage fellow human beings with
1. EMMANUEL LEVINAS, ETHICS AND INFINITY: CONVERSATIONS WITH PHILIPPE NEMO 90
(Richard A. Cohen trans., 1995).
2. Nancy A. Millich, Compassion Fatigue and the First Amendment: Are the Homeless
Constitutional Castaways?, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 255, 259–61 (1994) (“Empathy in the United
States is turning into intolerance as Americans seek to impose harsher restrictions on homeless people
to reduce their visibility. If society cannot solve the problems of the homeless, at least the public can
remove the homeless from sight.”).
3. The terms “panhandling” and “begging” are used interchangeably throughout this Note.
4. See Teresa Wiltz, Anti-Panhandling Laws Spread, Face Legal Challenges, PEW CHARITABLE
TR. (Nov. 12, 2015), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2015/11/
12/anti-panhandling-laws-spread-face-legal-challenges [https://perma.cc/7P64-HJX2]. “The term
‘panhandle’ stems from the outstretched arm of a beggar resembling a pan handle and is defined as ‘to
stop people on the street and ask for money, often telling a hard-luck story.’” Charles Mitchell, Note,
Aggressive Panhandling Legislation and Free Speech Claims: Begging for Trouble, 39 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REV. 697, 708 n.117 (1994) (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL UNABRIDGED
DICTIONARY 1630 (1971)).
5. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 725 (1990) (stating that “[s]olicitation is a recognized
form of speech protected by the First Amendment”); City of Lakewood v. Willis, 375 P.3d 1056, 1059
(Wash. 2016) (emphasizing that “the First Amendment protects ‘charitable appeals for funds,’
including appeals in the form of begging or panhandling”) (quoting Schaumburg v. Citizens for Better
Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980); see also Gresham v. Peterson, 225 F.3d 899, 904 (7th Cir. 2000);
Loper v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 999 F.2d 699, 704 (2d Cir. 1993); JUSTIN OLSON & SCOTT
MACDONALD, SEATTLE UNIVERSITY HOMELESS RIGHTS ADVOCACY PROJECT, WASHINGTON’S WAR
ON THE VISIBLY POOR: A SURVEY OF CRIMINALIZING ORDINANCES & THEIR ENFORCEMENT 17 (Sara
Rankin ed., 2015); NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, NO SAFE PLACE: THE
CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS IN U.S. CITIES 21 (2014) [hereinafter NLCHP,
CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS].
6. See McLaughlin v. City of Lowell, 140 F. Supp. 3d 177, 184 (D. Mass. 2015) (emphasizing
that “panhandling is not merely a minor, instrumental act of expression”).
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the hope of receiving aid and compassion.”7 Despite these constitutional
protections, some cities restrict panhandling outright, while other cities
restrict where and how people can panhandle.8 For example, many cities
have enacted legislation prohibiting the manner in which individuals may
exercise their constitutional right to panhandle. These manner prohibitions
are commonly placed under the umbrella category of “aggressive” or
“coercive” panhandling. This categorization is misleading, however,
because these laws are drafted in a way that allow them to be used against
individuals engaged in peaceful, non-violent begging.9 As a result,
aggressive begging laws raise serious constitutional and policy concerns.
Ultimately, the enactment and enforcement of anti-panhandling laws
exacerbate homelessness, rather than solving the underlying cause. Once
a person has been charged with panhandling, the climb out of
homelessness becomes infinitely more difficult. With a criminal record,
people experiencing homelessness are further hindered from accessing
employment, housing, and public benefits.10 Furthermore, these laws are
costly for taxpayers because people experiencing homelessness are
constantly being cycled through the criminal justice system.11 Finally,
these laws violate the constitutional rights of people experiencing
homelessness.12
Section I of this Note provides an overview of the First Amendment
and the protection of free speech. Section II provides a brief history of
panhandling laws generally and a description of the path to secondgeneration aggressive panhandling laws. Section III illustrates the
language and structure of aggressive panhandling laws in Washington
State, using Seattle and Tacoma’s panhandling ordinances as examples.
Section IV provides a three-part critique of aggressive panhandling laws.
In response to the critique, this Note concludes by proposing that
legislatures either repeal or substantially modify their panhandling laws.
First, legislatures should repeal provisions that provide vague,
perception-based components that criminalize panhandling in a manner
that causes “reasonable fear” or “compulsion.” Such provisions fail to
7. Benefit v. City of Cambridge, 679 N.E.2d 184, 190 (Mass. 1997).
8. Wiltz, supra note 4 (noting a 25% increase in city-wide bans on begging in public and a 20%
increase in bans in particular public places, such as near schools and banks, between 2011 and 2014);
see also NLCHP, CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS, supra note 5, at 20.
9. See, e.g., LACEY, WASH., MUN. CODE § 5.21.040(G) (1998) (criminalizing begging in a group
of two or more people or “within fifty feet of any other panhandler”); see also NLCHP,
CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS, supra note 5, at 20 (explaining how aggressive panhandling
laws are “designed to be enforced against people who are engaging in harmless activities when
requesting a donation”).
10. NLCHP, CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS, supra note 5, at 45.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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provide reasonable notice of what conduct is prohibited and cater to
established societal biases and prejudices about people experiencing
homelessness and poverty. Second, legislatures should repeal time, place,
and distance restrictions on panhandling that resemble provisions courts
have already invalidated as unnecessary to serve a compelling public
safety interest. Third, legislatures should repeal panhandling provisions
that restrict conduct already prohibited by existing laws that cover the
same conduct without restricting protected speech.
Panhandling laws are, at their very core, content-based
discriminations on protected speech.13 Accordingly, legislatures and
readers are encouraged to question whether these strategic,
constitutionally suspect components of aggressive panhandling laws are
justified.
I.

THE FIRST AMENDMENT

Laws that prohibit or restrict panhandling often violate the right to
freedom of speech guaranteed under the First Amendment.14 A brief
overview of the First Amendment and how the Court engages the various
levels of scrutiny is essential to understanding why legislatures should
consider either modifying or repealing their anti-panhandling laws.
The First Amendment prohibits restricting speech “because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”15 A law is contentbased if it regulates a particular viewpoint or speech made for a particular
purpose.16 Content-based restrictions on speech in a public forum are
presumptively unconstitutional and subject to strict scrutiny.17 To
withstand strict scrutiny, the restriction must be necessary to serve a
compelling government interest and the least restrictive means of
achieving that end.18 In contrast, content-neutral restrictions regulate the
time, place, and manner of speech, are justified without reference to the
content of the regulated speech, and do not regulate speech made for one
13. For a definition and discussion of “content-based” restrictions under the First Amendment,
see infra Section I.
14. NLCHP, CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS, supra note 5, at 9, 21, 26.
15. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015).
16. Id. at 2227. For example, a law that restricts solicitation made for the purpose of obtaining
money or goods as charity, but not solicitation made for commercial purposes is a content-based
discrimination on speech. See City of Lakewood v. Willis, 375 P.3d 1056, 1063 (Wash. 2016).
17. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2222.
18. See id. at 2226. Compare Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 245–46 (2002)
(stating that “the freedom of speech . . . does not embrace certain categories of speech, including
defamation, incitement, obscenity, and pornography produced with real children”) with McLaughlin
v. City of Lowell, 140 F. Supp. 3d 177, 189 (D. Mass. 2015) (noting that “the promotion of tourism
and business has never been found to be a compelling government interest for the purposes of the First
Amendment”).
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purpose over others.19 Content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations
are subject to intermediate scrutiny.20 To withstand intermediate scrutiny,
the regulation must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant government
interest and leave open ample alternative channels for individuals to
communicate their information.21
The U.S. Supreme Court recently clarified the analytical framework
courts must use to determine whether a law is content-based or contentneutral.22 To determine whether strict scrutiny applies, courts must first
determine whether a law is content-based “on its face” before determining
whether the legislature’s purported “purpose and justifications for the law
are content based.”23 If the court concludes that a law is content-based on
its face, the law is “subject to strict scrutiny regardless of the government’s
benign motive, content-neutral justification, or lack of ‘animus toward the
idea contained’ in the regulated speech.”24 As such, the government’s
motives or justifications are irrelevant to the content-based analysis.25
Innocuous “justifications cannot transform a facially content-based law
into one that is content neutral.”26 Therefore, the city bears the burden of
demonstrating that its justification for regulating panhandling is not mere
pretext, that the harms it seeks to mitigate are real, and that the regulation
will alleviate these harms in a material way.27 In other words, justification
must be genuine and supported by a strong basis of actual evidence, rather
than “shoddy data”28 or “hypothesized or invented”29 responses.
Based on the Supreme Court’s clarification and subsequent federal
and state court jurisprudence, it is clear that anti-panhandling laws are
content-based restrictions on speech. Indeed, when people experiencing
19. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
20. See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2239; Ward, 491 U.S. at 791.
21. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791.
22. See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2228; Browne v. City of Grand Junction, 136 F. Supp. 3d 1276, 1289
(D. Colo. 2015) (noting that the Supreme Court in Reed provided needed “clarification as to how lower
courts should go about determining whether a restriction on protected speech is content-based or
content-neutral”).
23. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2228 (clarifying that “strict scrutiny applies either when a law is content
based on its face or when the purpose and justification for the law are content based,” and mandating
that courts “evaluate each question before” concluding “the law is content neutral and thus subject to
a lower level of scrutiny”) (emphasis added).
24. Browne, 136 F. Supp. 3d at 1287–88 (quoting Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2228).
25. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2228.
26. Id.
27. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 624 (1994); see also McLaughlin v. City of
Lowell, 140 F. Supp. 3d 177, 189–90 (D. Mass. 2015) (noting that protecting public safety and
preventing coercion may constitute compelling governmental interests insofar as “the legislature has
a strong basis in evidence to support that justification”).
28. McLaughlin, 140 F. Supp. 3d at 187 (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc.,
535 U.S. 425, 426 (2002)).
29. Id. at 190 (quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996)).
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poverty approach their fellow citizens with a plea for monetary assistance,
they implicitly and explicitly convey “conditions of poverty,
homelessness, and unemployment, as well as a lack of access to medical
care, reentry services for persons convicted of crimes, and mental health
support for veterans.”30 Attempts to regulate this message restrain an
individual’s ability to express the conditions of their poverty, as well as
the homeless crisis in general, to their fellow citizens.31 Aside from the
policy concerns surrounding such legislation, content-based restrictions on
speech ultimately fail to survive constitutional muster.
II.

BACKGROUND AND THE PATH TO AGGRESSIVE PANHANDLING
LAWS

Although anti-vagrancy laws have existed since Colonial times, the
enactment of anti-panhandling legislation in particular has increased in
recent years.32 While public safety and health concerns typically serve as
the purported basis for aggressive panhandling laws,33 less compelling
reasons often motivate the enactment of these laws. First, legislatures have
expressed concern that visible poverty is an eyesore and has a negative
effect on tourism.34 Second, requests for money from a visibly poor person
can be unpleasant and uncomfortable for the solicited party.35 Third, it is
commonly believed that money given to a person experiencing
homelessness will go towards the purchase of drugs or alcohol instead of

30. Browne v. City of Grand Junction, No. 14-cv-00809-CMA-KLM, 2015 WL 3568313, at *5
(D. Colo. June 8, 2015).
31. Id. (emphasizing that attempts “to regulate this message is an attempt to restrain the
expression of conditions of poverty to other citizens”).
32. See Wiltz, supra note 4.
33. NLCHP, CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS, supra note 5, at 12 (explaining that although
laws that criminalize homelessness are “often justified as necessary public health and public safety
measures,” the real motivation is to “move visibly homeless people out of commercial and tourist
districts or . . . out of entire cities”); see also OLSON & MACDONALD, supra note 5, at 5 (noting “health
safety, or general public order” as the purported justification for laws criminalizing homelessness).
See generally Robert Teir, Maintaining Safety and Civility in Public Spaces: A Constitutional
Approach to Aggressive Begging, 54 LA. L. REV. 285 (1993).
34. For example, many begging laws explicitly provide that promoting tourism and business,
and preserving the quality of urban life is one of the purposes for the law. See, e.g., CENTRALIA,
WASH., MUN. CODE § 10.37.010 (2014); PUYALLUP, WASH., MUN. CODE § 9A.08.010 (2009);
TACOMA, WASH., MUN. CODE § 8.13A.010 (2007). But see McLaughlin, 140 F. Supp. 3d at 190
(emphasizing that the promotion of visitors and tourism “has never been . . . a compelling government
interest,” nor has it ever been sufficient “to allow content-based restrictions on speech . . . to survive
strict scrutiny”).
35. But see McLaughlin, 140 F. Supp. 3d at 189 (“[I]t is core First Amendment teaching that on
streets and sidewalks a person might be ‘confronted with an uncomfortable message’ that they cannot
avoid; this ‘is a virtue, not a vice.’” (quoting McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2529 (2014))).
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food or other necessities.36 Finally, it is believed that allowing individuals
to beg will discourage people experiencing homelessness from getting a
job.37
The Path to Aggressive Panhandling Laws
A sharp increase in anti-panhandling ordinances occurred between
1976 and 1980, a period which coincided with a national decline in
affordable housing.38 Although a slight drop in the enactment of these
ordinances occurred between 1981 and 1990, cities have been consistently
enacting panhandling restrictions in increasing numbers since 1991.39 A
likely reason for the increase is the relatively recent upsurge of aggressive
panhandling laws. During the 1990s, courts began to strike down outright
bans on panhandling as unconstitutional.40 In response, “cities . . . tried to
get around those decisions by enacting what they called ‘aggressive’
panhandling laws.”41
First-generation anti-panhandling laws that prohibited panhandling
outright failed to survive constitutional muster because they were contentbased restrictions on speech and not the least restrictive means of
achieving a compelling government interest.42 In response, cities began
36. Wiltz, supra note 4 (explaining that proponents of anti-panhandling laws argue that “giving
money to panhandlers enables addicts and prevents them from getting the help they need”); see also
Aaron Burkhalter, Signs of The Times, REAL CHANGE (Dec. 19, 2013),
http://realchangenews.org/2013/12/19/signs-times [https://perma.cc/R6RQ-UTUF] (reporting how
cities discourage people from giving donations to panhandlers by erecting signs that display “Keep
the change. Don’t support panhandling. The majority of your change goes to Drugs & Alcohol. Help
more by giving to charity.”). But see JOEL BLAU, THE VISIBLE POOR: HOMELESSNESS IN THE UNITED
STATES x (1993) (quashing persistent “myths” that homeless people are “somehow responsible for
their own poverty” by explaining that “[once] we acknowledge . . . drugs, alcoholism, or mental
illness . . . are not sufficient explanations of homelessness, we can begin to explore the real causes”).
37. But see NLCHP, CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS, supra note 5, at 32 (estimating that
“44% of all homeless people are employed on a temporary or full-time basis”).
38. Id. at 14, 35 (reporting a loss of ten thousand units of federally subsidized housing within the
United States each year since the 1970s).
39. SEATTLE UNIVERSITY HOMELESS RIGHTS ADVOCACY PROJECT, BEGGING FOR CHANGE:
BEGGING RESTRICTIONS THROUGHOUT WASHINGTON (Sara Rankin & Justin Olson eds., forthcoming
2018) (on file with the Seattle University Homeless Rights Advocacy Project).
40. Telephone Interview with Sarah Wunsch, Deputy Legal Dir., ACLU of Mass. (Feb. 26,
2016); see, e.g., Loper v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 999 F.2d 699, 705 (2d Cir. 1993); Benefit v. City of
Cambridge, 679 N.E.2d 184, 189–90 (Mass. 1997).
41. Telephone Interview with Sarah Wunsch, supra note 40.
42. See, e.g., Benefit, 679 N.E.2d at 189–90; Loper, 999 F.2d at 705. Courts also became more
inclined to strike down laws even if the city showed a compelling governmental safety interest. See
McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2537–38 (invalidating an abortion clinic buffer zone statute as insufficiently
narrow because it directly burdened protected speech to achieve the same significant government
purpose as laws that did not directly burden speech); see also Cynthia Barmore, Panhandling After
McCullen v. Coakley, 16 NEV. L.J. 585 (2016) (arguing, after McCullen, the majority of solicitation
laws now fail when applied in a traditional public forum).
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drafting second-generation, “aggressive panhandling” laws43 in an attempt
to circumvent the content-based analysis by adding aggressive conduct
provisions to pre-existing panhandling ordinances.44 The technique was to
create a constitutional, content-neutral law that the city could argue
regulates the manner in which people ask for donations, not what they say
when asking for it.45 Thus, if a challenge is brought against the city’s
aggressive panhandling law, the city may defend its position by arguing
that (1) the law is a content-neutral, “manner” restriction regulating
“activity, not speech” and (2) even if content-based, it has been narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling public safety interest.46
Despite these efforts, courts have held that variants of these secondgeneration aggressive panhandling laws are content-based restrictions and
subject to strict scrutiny when the prohibited conduct is couched within a
regulatory scheme that discriminates against a particular form of
expression.47 For example, after the Seventh Circuit held a city’s ordinance
prohibiting requests for money was a form of content discrimination, and
thus subject to strict scrutiny,48 the city modified the ordinance by adding
43. See Teir, supra note 33, at 326.
The best way to confront the content-neutrality issue is head-on. That is, assert that,
because a beggar’s speech is not prohibited, the community can regulate his or her method
of presentation. This approach . . . calls for a focus on the conduct even though the neutral
regulation only applies to people who make a certain kind of utterance. While the issue is
a close one, it appears that laws aimed at aggressive begging (but not sweeping begging
prohibitions) pass the content-neutrality test.
Id.
44. See infra Section III for common examples of such conduct.
45. Wiltz, supra note 4.
46. See, e.g., LACEY, WASH., MUN. CODE § 5.21.010 (1998) (stating that its panhandling
regulations serve the purpose of promoting “the health, safety, peace, and general welfare” of its
citizens and visitors); ARLINGTON, WASH., MUN. CODE § 9.56.010(1) (2015) (stating that its
solicitation and camping regulations serve to “protect and preserve the public safety of pedestrians
and to insure the safe and efficient movement of pedestrian and vehicular traffic in public places”).
47. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. City of Lowell, 140 F. Supp. 3d 177, 185 (D. Mass. 2015)
(emphasizing that when a law “targets a particular form of expressive speech—the solicitation of
immediate charitable donations—and applies its regulatory scheme only to that subject matter” it is
subject to strict scrutiny even if challenged provisions regulates conduct accompanying such
expression); id. (illustrating that targeting immediate donations allows for a “passerby to sign a
petition, but not a check” or to “vocally request that a passerby . . . make a donation tomorrow, but not
today (a distinction that may be of great import to someone seeking a meal and a bed tonight)”); Thayer
v. City of Worcester, 144 F. Supp. 3d 218, 228, 238 (D. Mass. 2015) (holding a prohibition that made
it “unlawful for any person to beg, panhandle or solicit in an aggressive manner” content-based and
“unconstitutional in its entirety”); Browne v. City of Grand Junction, 136 F. Supp. 3d 1276, 1288,
1292 (D. Colo. 2015) (holding that strict scrutiny applied to city’s aggressive begging ordinance
despite the city’s argument that it was a “content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction” on
speech).
48. Norton v. City of Springfield, 806 F.3d 411, 413 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct.
1173 (2016).
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a conduct-based element. The modified ordinance prohibited individuals
from approaching others and asking for immediate monetary or gratuitous
donations.49 After another constitutional challenge, the city contended that
the ordinance “regulates activity, not speech.”50 Nevertheless, the court
held that the ordinance was a content-based limitation on speech that
restricted individuals from approaching others for a donation, but allowed
individuals engaging in other types of speech to approach others.51 Courts
continue to follow this trend of invalidating aggressive panhandling
laws.52
III.
THE LANGUAGE AND STRUCTURE OF
AGGRESSIVE PANHANDLING LAWS IN WASHINGTON STATE
Aggressive panhandling prohibitions create vague, subjective
guidelines on how individuals can request donations. Generally, cities
with aggressive panhandling laws define “aggressive panhandling” as
begging “with the intent to intimidate53 another person into giving money
or goods.”54 Although the definition provides an element of intent, the
49. Norton v. City of Springfield, No. 15-3276, 2015 WL 8023461, at *1 (C.D. Ill. Dec. 4, 2015)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
50. Id. at *2.
51. Id. at *2–3.
Although the language of the current ordinance has been modified, it still addresses the content of the
Plaintiffs’ speech. The Plaintiffs can ask for the time, talk about the weather, ask someone to sign a
petition, or even solicit support (either nonmonetary support or for a future contribution) for causes or
organizations while approaching within five feet of the person being addressed. However, the
Plaintiffs are not permitted to ask pedestrians for ‘an immediate donation of money or other gratuity’
while ‘knowingly approaching within five feet’ of the individual. The ordinance subjects the Plaintiffs
to criminal penalties for asking for immediate donations of money in those circumstances. . . . Because
the . . . ordinance prohibits this type of speech in the designated area while allowing other types, the
Court must conclude it is content-based.
Id. at *2
52. See, e.g., Norton, 806 F.3d at 413 (invalidating an aggressive begging ordinance because it
was a content-based restriction on speech); McLaughlin, 140 F. Supp. 3d at 197 (holding a panhandling
provision and an aggressive panhandling provision violated the First Amendment); Thayer, 144 F.
Supp. 3d at 237 (invalidating an aggressive begging ordinance on First Amendment grounds); Browne,
136 F. Supp. 3d at 1294 (same); City of Lakewood v. Willis, 375 P.3d 1056, 1059 (Wash. 2016)
(invalidation two provisions of an aggressive begging ordinance).
53. Some ordinances use “intimidate or coerce.” See infra note 53.
54. ANACORTES, WASH., MUN. CODE § 9.24.050(A) (1999); ARLINGTON, WASH., MUN. CODE
§ 9.56.020(1) (2015) (“with the intent to intimidate or coerce . . .”) (emphasis added); AUBURN,
WASH., MUN. CODE § 9.08.010(B)(1) (2002); BELLEVUE, WASH., MUN. CODE §10.06.010(B)(1)
(2005); BONNEY LAKE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 9.11.060(A) (2016) (“‘Aggressive solicitation’ means
behavior that is intended to harass or intimidate . . .”); BREMERTON, WASH., MUN. CODE
§ 9A.44.110(b) (2014); DES MOINES, WASH., MUN. CODE §§ 9.68.030(2), (1)(a) & (c) (1993);
EVERETT, WASH., MUN. CODE § 9.52.010(A)(2) (1987); FEDERAL WAY, WASH., MUN. CODE
§§ 6.35.030(1)(a), (2) (2001); LAKE STEVENS, WASH., MUN. CODE § 9.08.030(b)(1) (2012);
MARYSVILLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 6.37.020(1) (2012) (“with the intent to intimidate or coerce . . .)
(emphasis added); MOSES LAKE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 9.22.010 (2011); MOUNT VERNON, WASH.,
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solicitor’s conduct is more often restricted by the reaction of the person
being solicited. For example, most cities using this definition of aggressive
panhandling define the word “intimidate” to mean: “to engage in conduct
which would make a reasonable person feel fearful or compelled.”55
Several of the cities define intimidate as “to coerce or frighten into
submission or obedience.”56 Finally, a handful of the cities use a
combination of both definitions: “to coerce or frighten into submission or
obedience, or to engage in conduct which would make a reasonable person
fearful or feel compelled.”57
After providing a general definition of aggressive panhandling and
intimidation, cities often list prohibited conduct that qualifies as
“aggressive” and “intimidating.” However, some cities fail to provide
objective conduct entirely.58 For the cities that list objective conduct, these
enumerations are frequently prefaced by language such as “evidence of
intimidation includes, but is not limited to . . . [,]” thus leaving additional
forms of conduct that could potentially qualify as “aggressive” and
MUN. CODE § 9.21.060(A) (2011); OAK HARBOR, WASH., MUN. CODE § 6.95.020(1) (2014) (“with
the intent to intimidate or coerce . . .”) (emphasis added); PORT ANGELES, WASH., MUN. CODE §
11.18.020(A) (2009); RENTON, WASH., MUN. CODE § 6-25-1(2011); SAMMAMISH, WASH., MUN.
CODE § 22.05.110(1)(a) (2017); SEATAC, WASH., MUN. CODE § 8.05.740(B)(1)(a) (1995); SEATTLE,
WASH., MUN. CODE § 12A.12.015(A)(1) (1994); SHORELINE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 9.10.140(B)(1)
(1996); SPOKANE VALLEY, WASH., MUN. CODE § 8.25.020 (2016); TUMWATER, WASH., MUN. CODE
§ 9.08.010 (2010); UNIVERSITY PLACE, WASH., MUN. CODE §§ 9.55.020 (A)(2), .010(1) (2017);
WENATCHEE, WASH., MUN. CODE §§ 6A.13.010(1), 6A.13.020(2) (1989) (leaving “intimidate”
undefined); MOUNTLAKE TERRACE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 9.40.030(B)(1) (2015); VANCOUVER,
WASH., MUN. CODE § 7.04.030(1) (2003).
55. See, e.g., ARLINGTON, WASH., MUN. CODE § 9.56.020(7) (2015); BONNEY LAKE, WASH.,
MUN. CODE § 9.11.060(C) (2016) (Intimidate “means to coerce or frighten into submission or
obedience or to engage in conduct which would make a reasonable person fearful or feel compelled
to give the person money or goods.”); BREMERTON, WASH., MUN. CODE § 9A.44.110(a)(1) (2014);
EVERETT, WASH., MUN. CODE § 9.52.020(D) (1987); FEDERAL WAY, WASH., MUN. CODE
§ 6.35.030(1)(e) (2001) (Intimidate “means to engage in words or conduct which would make a
reasonable person feel compelled to give money to a person.”); MARYSVILLE, WASH., MUN. CODE
§ 6.37.020(3) (2012); MOUNT VERNON, WASH., MUN. CODE § 9.21.050(E) (2011); PORT ANGELES,
WASH., MUN. CODE § 11.18.020(B) (2009); RENTON, WASH., MUN. CODE § 6-25-1 (2011) (Intimidate
“means to use words or engage in conduct that would likely cause a reasonable person to fear bodily
harm, fear damage to or loss of property, or otherwise be compelled into giving money or other things
of value.”); SAMMAMISH, WASH., MUN. CODE § 22.05.110(b) (2017); SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE
§ 12A.12.015(A)(2) (1994); UNIVERSITY PLACE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 9.55.010 (2)(A)(2) (2017);
VANCOUVER, WASH., MUN. CODE § 7.04.030(3) (2003).
56. ANACORTES, WASH., MUN. CODE § 9.24.050(B)(3) (1999); BELLEVUE, WASH., CITY CODE
10.06.010(B)(3) (2005); BURIEN WASH., MUN. CODE §§ 9.80.400(1) & (2)(a), (c) (1993); DES
MOINES, WASH., MUN. CODE §§ 9.68.030(2), (1)(a) & (c) (1993); LAKE STEVENS, WASH., MUN.
CODE § 9.08.030(c) (2012); MOSES LAKE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 9.22.010 (2011); MOUNTLAKE
TERRACE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 9.40.030(B)(1) (2015); SHORELINE, WASH., MUN. CODE
§ 9.10.140(B)(3) (1996); SPOKANE VALLEY, WASH., MUN. CODE § 8.25.020 (2016); TUMWATER,
WASH., MUN. CODE § 9.08.010 (2010).
57. See, e.g., AUBURN, WASH., MUN. CODE § 9.08.010(B)(3) (2002) (emphasis added).
58. See, e.g., SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 12A.12.015 (2016).
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“intimidating.”59 These drafting practices are likely to cause confusion
among individuals who wish to peacefully beg while remaining compliant
with the law.
Further, the lengthy list of prohibited conduct in many aggressive
panhandling ordinances (if conduct is provided at all) illustrates how these
ordinances are, arguably, not the least restrictive means of achieving a
compelling governmental interest. Some common prohibitions include:60
(1) approaching within a certain distance of a person for the purpose of
requesting a donation without that person’s consent to solicitation;61 (2)
persisting in begging or following a person after being given a negative
response;62 (3) begging in a group of two or more people;63 (4) begging in
a manner that exploits minors;64 (5) begging from anyone under the age of

59. See, e.g., FEDERAL WAY, WASH., MUN. CODE §§ 6.35.030(2)(a), (1)(e)(i)–(ii) (2001)
(“evidence of intimidation includes, but is not limited to . . .”); KENNEWICK, WASH., MUN. CODE
§ 10.08.120 (repealed by Kennewick City Council on May 7, 2017 in light of City of Lakewood v.
Willis, 375 P.3d 1056 (Wash. 2016)); RENTON, WASH., MUN. CODE § 6.25.1(2011); SPOKANE, WASH.,
MUN. CODE § 10.10.025 (B)(1) (2015) (criminalizing begging while intentionally engaging “in
conduct that would likely intimidate a reasonable person, including, but not limited to . . .”).
60. See generally BEGGING FOR CHANGE, supra note 39.
61. See, e.g., ARLINGTON, WASH., MUN. CODE § 9.56.020(6)(B) (2015); CENTRALIA, WASH.,
MUN. CODE §§ 10.37.030, .020(B) (2014); COVINGTON, WASH., MUN. CODE § 9.190.020(1)(b)
(2010); ISSAQUAH, WASH., MUN. CODE § 9.45.020(A)(2) (2008); LACEY, WASH., MUN. CODE
§ 5.21.040(A) (1998); LONGVIEW, WASH., MUN. CODE § 9.23.040(1) (2008); MARYSVILLE, WASH.,
MUN. CODE § 6.37.020(2)(b) (2012); MONROE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 9.35.020(A)(2) (2008); Oak
Harbor, WASH., MUN. CODE § 6.95.020(2)(b) (2014).
62. See, e.g., ARLINGTON, WASH., MUN. CODE § 9.56.020(6)(C) (2015) (persisting provision);
BONNEY LAKE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 9.11.060(A)(a) (2016) (persisting provision); BONNEY LAKE,
WASH., MUN. CODE § 9.11.060(A)(c) (2016) (following provision); COVINGTON, WASH., MUN. CODE
§ 9.190.020(1)(c) (2010) (persisting provision); FEDERAL WAY, WASH., MUN. CODE
§§ 6.35.030(2)(a), .030(1)(e)(i)–(ii) (2001) (persisting and following provision); ISSAQUAH, WASH.,
MUN. CODE § 9.45.020(A)(2) (2008) (persisting provision); KENNEWICK, WASH., MUN. CODE
§ 10.08.120(2)(a) (repealed 2017) (persisting and following provision); KENT, WASH., MUN. CODE
9.02.640(A)(4), (B)(1) (2015) (persisting and following provision); MARYSVILLE, WASH., MUN.
CODE § 6.37.020(2)(c) (2012) (persisting provision); MONROE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 9.35.020(A)(3)
(2008) (persisting provision); OAK HARBOR, WASH., MUN. CODE § 6.95.020(2)(c) (2014) (persisting
provision); LACEY, WASH., MUN. CODE § 5.21.040(E) (1998) (following provision); LONGVIEW,
WASH., MUN. CODE § 9.23.040(5) (2008) (following provision); PUYALLUP, WASH., MUN. CODE §
9A.08.020(2)(b) (2009) (persisting provision); TACOMA, WASH., MUN. CODE § 8.13.A.020(B)(2)
(2007) (persisting provision); SPOKANE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 10.10.025 (B)(1) (2015) (persisting
and following provision); SUNNYSIDE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 9.86.050(D) (1985) (persisting
provision).
63. See, e.g., LACEY, WASH., MUN. CODE § 5.21.040(G) (1998) (group of two or more people).
64. See, e.g., ARLINGTON, WASH., MUN. CODE § 9.56.070 (2015); AUBURN, WASH., MUN. CODE
§ 9.08.010(B)(1)(d) (2002); BONNEY LAKE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 9.11.050(B) (2016); COVINGTON,
WASH., MUN. CODE § 9.190.020(1)(h) (2010); SEATAC, WASH., MUN. CODE § 8.05.740(B)(1)(d)
(1995); RENTON, WASH., MUN. CODE § 6.25.1 (2011). But see McLaughlin v. City of Lowell, 140 F.
Supp. 3d 177, 195 (D. Mass. 2015) (noting that such laws will not survive strict scrutiny “in the
absence of record evidence . . . that ‘intimidating’ group panhandling is more dangerous than
‘intimidating’ solo panhandling”).

298

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 41:249

sixteen;65 (6) making a false or misleading representation while begging;66
(7) delivering or attempting to deliver products or services and pressuring
payment in return;67 (8) engaging with the driver of a parked car while
begging;68 (9) blocking or impeding pedestrian traffic while begging;69
(10) blocking, impeding, or distracting vehicular traffic while begging;
and (11) begging while intoxicated.70
Although begging may not be desirable behavior, should it be
criminalized? Notably, both state and municipal codes have provisions
that address the same public safety concerns purported in aggressive
panhandling laws without restricting protected speech. Considering that
content neutral laws already criminalize such behavior without restricting
speech and without targeting a particular class of individuals, are these
conduct-based aggressive begging provisions necessary?
The following Subsection provides an illustration of (1) a perceptionbased panhandling ordinance that lacks any objective conduct71 and (2) an
overly broad conduct-based panhandling ordinance with perception-based
components.72

65. See, e.g., LACEY, WASH., MUN. CODE § 5.21.040(D) (2008); Longview, WASH., MUN. CODE
§§ 9.23.040(4) (2008).
66. See, e.g., AUBURN, WASH., MUN. CODE § 9.08.010(B)(1)(b) (2002); CENTRALIA, WASH.,
MUN. CODE §§ 10.37.030, .020(B)(7) (2014); COVINGTON, WASH., MUN. CODE § 9.190.020(1)(g)
(2010); GOLD BAR, WASH., MUN. CODE § 9.15.020(2)(b) (2010); ISSAQUAH, WASH., MUN. CODE
§ 9.45.020(A)(6) (2008); MARYSVILLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 6.37.020(2)(f) (2012); MONROE,
WASH., MUN. CODE § 9.35.020(A)(6) (2008); OAK HARBOR, WASH., MUN. CODE § 6.95.020(2)(f)
(2014); SEATAC, WASH., MUN. CODE 8.05.740(B)(1)(b) (1995).
67. See, e.g., AUBURN, WASH., MUN. CODE § 9.08.010(B)(1)(e) (2002); PUYALLUP, WASH.,
MUN. CODE § 9A.08.020(2)(f) (2009); SEATAC, WASH., MUN. CODE § 8.05.740(B)(1)(e) (1995);
TACOMA, WASH., MUNI. CODE § 8.13.A.020(B)(6) (2007).
68. See, e.g., MOUNT VERNON, WASH., MUN. CODE § 9.21.050(E) (2011); LACEY, WASH., MUN.
CODE § 5.21.030(C) (1998) (amended 2008); TACOMA, WASH., MUN. CODE § 13.A.030(A)(1)(g)
(2007).
69. See, e.g., ARLINGTON, WASH., MUN. CODE § 9.56.020(6)(D) (2015); AUBURN, WASH., MUN.
CODE § 9.08.010(B)(1)(c) & (6) (2002); BONNEY LAKE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 9.11.060(A)(b) (2016);
CENTRALIA, WASH., MUN. CODE § 10.37.030, .020(B)(4); COVINGTON, WASH., MUN. CODE §
9.190.020(1)(d) (2010); EVERETT, WASH., MUN. CODE §§ 9.52.010(A)(1), 9.52.020(A) (1987);
FEDERAL WAY, WASH., MUN. CODE §§ 6.35.030(1)(b), (2)(b) (2001); ISSAQUAH, WASH., MUN. CODE
§ 9.45.020(A)(4) (2008); LACEY, WASH., MUN. CODE § 5.21.040(B) (1998); LONGVIEW, WASH., CITY
CODE § 9.23.040(2) (2008); MARYSVILLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 6.37.020(2)(d) (2012); MONROE,
WASH., MUN. CODE § 9.35.020(A)(4) (2008); PUYALLUP, WASH., MUN. CODE § 9A.08.020(2)(c)
(2009); SUNNYSIDE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 5.22.050(C) (2010); TACOMA, WASH., MUN. CODE §
8.13.A.020(B)(3) (2007); WENATCHEE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 6A.13.020(1).
70. See, e.g., ARLINGTON, WASH., MUN. CODE § 9.56.060 (2015); LAKEWOOD, WASH., MUN.
CODE § 9A.04.020A (2011) (amended 2017).
71. SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE ch. 12A.12 (2016).
72. TACOMA, WASH., MUN. CODE ch. 8.13A (2007).
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Seattle’s and Tacoma’s Panhandling Ordinances as Illustrations
Seattle’s pedestrian interference ordinance is an example of an
aggressive panhandling law that fails to provide examples of objective
conduct. Under this ordinance, it is a misdemeanor to aggressively beg in
a public place.73 Penalties include a fine up to $1,000 or imprisonment for
a term not to exceed ninety days, or both.74 Other than the following
general definitions, the ordinance provides no guidance or details on how
this law should be enforced:
1. “Aggressively beg” means to beg with the intent to intimidate
another person into giving money or goods.
2. “Intimidate” means to engage in conduct which would make a
reasonable person fearful or feel compelled.
3. “Beg” means to ask for money or goods as a charity, whether by
words, bodily gestures, signs, or other means.
...
5. “Public place” means an area generally visible to public view and
includes alleys, bridges, buildings, driveways, parking lots, parks,
plazas, sidewalks and streets open to the general public, including
those that serve food or drink or provide entertainment, and the
doorways and entrances to buildings or dwellings and the grounds
enclosing them.75

In contrast, Tacoma’s panhandling ordinance provides a sweeping
list of prohibited conduct.76 The ordinance purports “to protect citizens
from the fear and intimidation accompanying certain kinds of solicitation,
to promote tourism and business, and to preserve the quality of urban life
while providing safe and appropriate venues for constitutionally protected
activity.”77 Under this ordinance, it is a gross misdemeanor to solicit78 “by
coercion.”79 Individuals violating this ordinance may be penalized with a
73. SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 12A.12.015 (2016) (“A person is guilty of pedestrian
interference if, in a public place, he or she intentionally. . . [a]ggressively begs.”). Bellevue and
Anacortes also use similar language in their aggressive begging ordinances. See BELLEVUE, WASH.,
CITY CODE § 10.06.010 (2005) (defining intimidate as “to coerce or frighten into submission or
obedience”); ANACORTES WASH., MUN. CODE § 9.24.050 (1999).
74. SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE §§ 12A.12.015(C), 12A.02.070 (2016).
75. Id. § 12A.12.015 (2016).
76. TACOMA, WASH., MUN. CODE ch. 8.13A (2007).
77. Id. § 8.13A.010 (2007).
78. Id. § 8.13A.020(I) (2007) (“Solicit and all derivative forms of solicit means to ask, beg,
solicit, or plead, whether orally or in a written or printed manner, for the purpose of immediately
receiving contributions, alms, charity, or gifts of items of value for oneself or another person.”).
79. Id. §§ 8.13A.020(I), 8.13A.040 (2007) (providing that “[i]t is unlawful for a person to solicit
by coercion”).
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$5,000 fine, incarceration of no more than one year, or both.80 The
ordinance defines “coercion” to mean the following:
1. to approach or speak to a person in such a manner as would cause
a reasonable person to believe that the person is being threatened with
either imminent bodily injury or the commission of a criminal act
upon the person or another person or upon property in the person’s
immediate possession;
2. to persist in a solicitation after the person solicited has given a
negative response;
3. to block, either individually or as part of a group of persons, the
passage of a solicited person;
4. to engage in conduct that would reasonably be construed as
intended to compel or force a solicited person to accede to demands;
5. to use violent or threatening gestures toward a person;
6. willfully providing or delivering, or attempting to provide or
deliver, unrequested or unsolicited services or products with a
demand or exertion of pressure for payment in return; or
7. to use profane, offensive, or abusive language, which is inherently
likely to provoke an immediate violent reaction.81

Additionally, the ordinance prohibits begging near an extensive list
of designated locations and facilities. Individuals who violate these “place
of solicitation” restrictions are guilty of a misdemeanor “subject to a
penalty of $1,000, incarceration for up to 90 days, or both a fine and a
penalty.”82 Specifically, the ordinance criminalizes begging within fifteen
feet of:
a. an automated teller machine;
b. the entrance of a building, unless the solicitor has permission from
the owner or occupant;
c. an exterior public pay telephone;
d. a self-service car wash;
e. a self-service fuel pump;
f. a public transportation stop; or

80. Id. § 8.13A.060 (2007).
81. TACOMA, WASH., MUN. CODE § 8.13A.020 (2007).
82. Id. § 8.13A.060 (2007).
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g. any parked vehicle as occupants of such vehicle enter or exit such
vehicle.83

For the purposes of these distance restrictions, measurement is
“made in a straight line, without regard to intervening structures or objects,
from the nearest point at which a solicitation is being conducted to
whichever is applicable of the following:”
1. the nearest entrance or exit of a facility in which an automated
teller machine is enclosed or, if the machine is not enclosed in a
facility, to the nearest part of the automated teller machine;
2. the nearest entrance or exit of a building;
3. the nearest part of an exterior public pay telephone;
4. the nearest part of the structure of a self-service car wash;
5. the nearest part of a self-service fuel pump;
6. the nearest point of any sign or marking designating an area as a
public transportation stop; or
7. any door of a parked vehicle that is being used by an occupant of
such vehicle to enter or exit such vehicle.84

Finally, the ordinance prohibits begging “after sunset or before
sunrise” and “in any public transportation facility or vehicle.”85
Seattle and Tacoma’s ordinances illustrate how aggressive begging
laws can be both vague and overly broad. Both legislative schemes are not
the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling governmental interest
and both allow for the criminalization of peaceful messages of need and
assistance.
IV.

ARGUMENTS AGAINST AGGRESSIVE PANHANDLING LAWS

Even ‘the presence of an unkempt and disheveled person holding out his
or her hand or a cup to receive a donation itself conveys a message of
need for support and assistance.’86
This Section provides a three-part critique of aggressive panhandling
laws. First, the majority of aggressive panhandling laws include a
perception-based provision that allows officers to base culpability on the
83. Id. § 8.13A.060 (2007).
84. Id. § 8.13A.030 (2007).
85. Id. § 8.13A.030(A)(2) (2007). But see Thayer v. City of Worcester, 144 F. Supp. 3d 218, 235
(D. Mass. 2015) (holding that a blanket prohibition on soliciting from thirty minutes after sunset to
thirty minutes after sunrise was unconstitutionally overbroad).
86. McLaughlin v. Lowell, 140 F. Supp. 3d 177, 184 (D. Mass. 2015) (quoting Loper v. N.Y.C.
Police Dep’t, 999 F.2d 699, 704 (2d Cir. 1993)).
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perception of the bystander rather than on the specific, objective conduct
of the individual asking for aid.87 When little or no guidance is provided
by the legislature regarding what objective conduct is prohibited, law
enforcement is left to rely on subjective perceptions. These subjective
perceptions may include what a reasonable person would perceive as
intent to intimidate—whether that perception is judged as a reasonable
person feeling fearful or compelled or some perceived manifestation of
intent to intimidate.88 The implicit and explicit bias towards the homeless
population coupled with the prejudice that this population typically
experiences can produce feelings of discomfort, repulsion, and even fear.89
Thus, these laws can potentially lead to arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement and disproportionately criminalize people experiencing
homelessness.
Second, even when evidence of aggressive panhandling is based on
objective conduct as well as time and place restrictions, these restrictions
are overbroad because they have the potential of chilling constitutionally
protected forms of peaceful begging.90 As will be discussed, both federal
and state courts have already invalidated some of the most common
conduct, time, and place provisions that accompany aggressive
panhandling laws for these reasons.
Third, even when aggressive panhandling laws provide provisions
that prohibit truly harmful or threatening behavior, the prohibited conduct
is often duplicative of existing, content-neutral laws that do not single out
constitutionally protected speech; thus undermining claims that the law
targets aggressive conduct rather than speech.91
A.

Perception-Based Panhandling Laws Lead to
Discriminatory and Arbitrary Enforcement

Vague, perception-based panhandling laws raise several
constitutional concerns. First, perception-based laws make it challenging
to know whether a reasonable person feels fearful or compelled because
of the panhandler’s actions, or because the mere presence of a visibly poor
87. See, e.g., SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 12A.12.015 (2016).
88. BEGGING FOR CHANGE, supra note 39.
89. See Sara K. Rankin, A Homeless Bill of Rights (Revolution), 45 SETON HALL L. REV. 383,
390 (2015) (citing Lasana T. Harris & Susan T. Fiske, Dehumanizing the Lowest of the Low:
Neuroimaging Responses to Extreme Out-Groups, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 847, 848 (2006)); see also Steven
J. Ballew, Panhandling and the First Amendment How Spider-Man Is Reducing the Quality of Life in
New York City, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 1167 (2016).
90. See, e.g., TACOMA, WASH., MUN. CODE ch. 8.13A (2007).
91. See, e.g., id. (prohibiting begging in “a manner as would cause a reasonable person to believe
that the person is being threatened with either imminent bodily injury or the commission of a criminal
act upon the person or another person or upon property in the person’s immediate possession”).
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person elicits feelings of repulsion or even sympathy.92 For example,
without providing any kind of objective conduct standard,93 Seattle’s
ordinance criminalizes individuals who beg while engaging in conduct
that would make a “reasonable person fearful or compelled” to give money
or goods.94
At first glance, this law may appear sensible, perhaps even
preferable. No one would sanction the act of forcing another person into
giving money or goods by use of coercion, fear, or intimidation. However,
because this law provides no objective conduct standard, the individual is
not on notice as to what conduct is prohibited. This is especially
problematic due to the existence of a “persistent and deeply-held prejudice
against poor and homeless people.”95 Studies show that people
experiencing homelessness can “elicit the worst kind of prejudice—
disgust and contempt—based on moral violations and subsequent negative
outcomes that these groups allegedly caused themselves.”96 This means
that the “reasonable person” standard on which many of these ordinances
are based could hold implicit prejudices against the panhandler.97 As a
result, it is difficult to determine whether a reasonable person feels fearful
or compelled because of the panhandler’s actions, or because of their mere
presence.98
Providing an exhaustive list of what conduct is prohibited may solve
this problem. However, legislatures should avoid listing conduct that has
the potential of reaching peaceful forms of begging. As the following
Section explains, aggressive panhandling laws that list objective conduct
92. See Rankin, A Homeless Bill of Rights, supra note 89, at 390 (noting a “persistent and deeplyheld prejudice against poor and homeless people”).
93. See supra notes 73–75 and accompanying text.
94. SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 12A.12.015 (2016); see also ANACORTES WASH., MUN.
CODE § 9.24.050 (1999); ARLINGTON, WASH., MUN. CODE § 9.56.020(1) (2015); BELLEVUE, WASH.,
CITY CODE § 10.06.010 (2005) (defining intimidate as “to coerce or frighten into submission or
obedience”) MARYSVILLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 6.37.020(1) (2012); OAK HARBOR, WASH., MUN.
CODE §§ 6.95.040, .020(1), .020(3) (2014).
95. See Rankin, A Homeless Bill of Rights, supra note 89, at 390 (citing Lasana T. Harris &
Susan T. Fiske, Dehumanizing the Lowest of the Low: Neuroimaging Responses to Extreme OutGroups, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 847, 848 (2006)).
96. Lasana T. Harris & Susan T. Fiske, Dehumanizing the Lowest of the Low: Neuroimaging
Responses to Extreme Out-Groups, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 847, 848 (2006).
97. See Rankin, A Homeless Bill of Rights, supra note 89, at 390; see also Ballew, supra note 89
(“Empirical evidence supports their theory and shows that individuals feel intimidated when they are
approached by panhandlers and even avoid certain areas out of fear of being approached for money.
In a Department of Justice (DOJ) Survey of San Francisco residents, 33% of those surveyed admitted
to giving money to panhandlers out of intimidation, and 40% said they feared for their safety around
panhandlers.” (citing MICHAEL S. SCOTT, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PANHANDLING 4 (2003))).
98. See City of Seattle v. Webster, 802 P.2d 1333, 1338 (Wash. 1990) (explaining that satisfying
due process requires, at a minimum, members of the public and law enforcement be provided with
notice of the prohibited conduct in order to avoid arbitrary and disparate enforcement).
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are still susceptible to First Amendment challenges when they prohibit an
overly broad amount of conduct.
B.

Conduct-Specific Aggressive Panhandling Laws
Violate the Overbreadth Doctrine

Panhandling prohibitions are content-based restrictions on speech
that are presumed unconstitutional unless justified by a compelling state
interest.99 Even if the law purports to prohibit aggressive conduct that may
accompany begging, the law is subject to strict scrutiny if it does not
prohibit solicitation generally, but only targets speech made for the
particular purpose of obtaining money or goods as a charity.100
Accordingly, conduct and behavior restrictions on panhandling still must
be the least restrictive means of achieving a necessary governmental
interest. Nevertheless, cities have adopted anti-panhandling ordinances
with extensive prohibitions on how, where, and when individuals can
panhandle. These extensive conduct and behavior restrictions on
panhandling, illustrated in Tacoma’s Panhandling ordinance,101 are
problematic for several reasons.
First, they are unconstitutionally overbroad because they can be
enforced against people engaging in harmless activities when requesting a
donation; thus creating a substantial chilling effect on constitutionallyprotected peaceful begging.102 A law is overbroad if it sweeps within its
prohibitions constitutionally-protected free speech activities.103 For
example, Tacoma’s ordinance has the potential of criminalizing the
actions of a person who silently holds a sign requesting aid fifteen feet
from the entrance or exit of a building, bus stop, gas station, or ATM.104
Tacoma also includes a blanket ban on begging at night.105 Although these

99. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert 135. S.Ct. 2218 (2015) (content-based limitations on speech
subject to strict scrutiny under First Amendment analysis); see also Thayer v. City of Worcester, 135
S.Ct. 2887 (2015) (remanding a decision upholding an anti-panhandling ordinance in light of Reed).
100. See Id. at 2227; McLaughlin v. City of Lowell, 140 F. Supp. 3d 177, 185 (D. Mass. 2015).
City of Lakewood v. Willis, 375 P.3d 1056, 1063 (Wash. 2016).
101. TACOMA, WASH., MUN. CODE § 8.13A (2007).
102. See supra notes 58–70 and accompanying text.
103. Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 458 (1987).
104. TACOMA, WASH., MUN. CODE § 8.13A.030 (2007). But cf. Thayer v. City of Worcester, 144
F. Supp. 3d 218, 235–37 (D. Mass. 2015) (invalidating similar distance restrictions because they were
“not the least restrictive means available to protect the public and therefore, [failed to] satisfy strict
scrutiny”).
105. TACOMA, WASH., MUN. CODE § 8.13A.030(A)(2)(b) (2007) (prohibiting solicitation “after
sunset or before sunrise”). But cf. Thayer, 144 F. Supp. 3d at 235 (invalidating city ordinance that
prohibited “soliciting any person in public after dark, which shall mean the time from one-half hour
before sunset to one-half hour after sunrise” because it was not the least restrictive means of achieving
a compelling government interest).
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provisions are aimed at targeting aggressive behavior, they have the
potential of barring constitutionally-protected forms of peaceful begging.
Second, extensive conduct and behavior restrictions on panhandling
are frequently both overinclusive and underinclusive. For example,
“between sunset and sunrise, a hungry, indigent person with no shelter
who vocally requests a passerby for spare change, food, a blanket, or any
other form of donated assistance is subject to criminal penalties.”106 A
person who silently holds a sign noting a request for monetary help while
standing fifteen feet away from the entrance of any building, a gas station,
or a bus stop risks a misdemeanor conviction, ninety days of incarceration,
and a $1,000 fine.107 At the same time a person can sell the daily news or
solicit votes without penalty under the ordinance. Accordingly, extensive
conduct and behavior restrictions on panhandling are overinclusive
because they restrict more speech than is necessary to serve a compelling
public safety interest. They are also underinclusive because they
criminalize speech when it is made for the purpose of obtaining an
immediate donation while permitting speech made for the purpose of
selling goods, soliciting customers, or obtaining votes.
Third, the listed conduct is frequently illustrative rather than
exclusive. For example, many aggressive panhandling provisions prohibit
unlawful conduct that may accompany panhandling, but introduce the list
of prohibited conduct with “including but not limited to” language. This
raises due process concerns because it leaves open the possibility that other
unspecified actions might also be considered illegal.108 Moreover, even in
situations where the prohibited conduct is sufficient evidence of
aggressive begging, the “intent to intimidate” element is effectively read
out of the ordinance.109 For example, if begging within fifteen feet of a bus
stop is prima facie evidence of the intent to intimidate, there is again an
unacceptable danger of chilling or criminalizing protected forms of
peaceful begging.110
106. BEGGING FOR CHANGE, supra note 39; TACOMA, WASH., MUN. CODE
§ 8.13A.030(A)(2)(b) (2007).
107. Id. §§ 8.13A.030(A), .030(B), .060.
108. See Gresham v. Peterson, 225 F.3d 899, 908 (7th Cir. 2000) (construing a list of prohibited
conduct in an Indianapolis panhandling ordinance to be exclusive rather than illustrative to save it
from a vagueness challenge, but noting that an incomplete list of prohibited behavior would raise
“serious due process concerns” because it would leave open the possibly that other unspecified actions
might also be considered illegal).
109. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365 (2003) (explaining how a cross burning statute
that “permits the Commonwealth to arrest, prosecute, and convict a person based solely on the fact of
cross burning itself” strips away “the very reason why a State may ban cross burning with intent to
intimidate”).
110. See, e.g., MOUNT VERNON, WASH., MUN. CODE § 9.21.050(E) (2011) (“[There is a]
presumption that begging in the following circumstances would make a reasonable person fearful or
feel compelled if begging occurs within 15 feet of: [an] ATM, [an] entrance of building . . . [an]
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In addition to prohibiting conduct that substantially chills peaceful
forms of begging, many aggressive begging laws also include provisions
that prohibit truly harmful and threatening behavior. However, as the
following section explains, these provisions are not the least restrictive
means of achieving a compelling public safety interest when the prohibited
conduct is duplicative of existing laws that target the same behavior
without restricting protected speech or targeting a particularly vulnerable
class of individuals. Not only do these provisions illuminate societal
notions that all people experiencing homelessness are criminals who are
prone to violence and drugs, they appear to be strategic methods of
circumventing constitutional challenges.
C.
Aggressive Panhandling Laws are Not Narrowly Tailored
Because They Are Duplicative of Existing Content-Neutral Laws that Do
Not Target Constitutionally Protected Speech
Although no one would sanction truly aggressive and threatening
behavior, readers are encouraged to question why drafting an entire subset
of laws that target begging are necessary to serve a compelling public
safety interest. This is especially the case when existing laws already
prohibit aggressive behavior without targeting an extremely vulnerable
population and a specific form of constitutionally-protected speech.
Because content-neutral laws already fully empower police officers to cite
or arrest those whose conduct poses a genuine risk of harm to others, such
ordinances are, arguably, not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
government interest.
Nearly all state and municipal codes have provisions that address
public safety concerns without restricting protected speech. For example,
after the Washington State Supreme Court determined provisions within
the City of Lakewood’s begging ordinance violated free speech,111 the City
of Kennewick repealed its aggressive begging ordinance.112 Importantly,
exterior public pay telephone, [a] self-service car wash or fuel pump, [a] public transportation stop, or
any parked vehicle as occupants . . . enter or exit such vehicle” (emphasis added)). But see Browne v.
City of Grand Junction, 136 F. Supp. 3d 1276, 1293 (D. Colo. 2015) (holding a ban on panhandling
within twenty feet of an ATM or bus stop was not necessary to serve a compelling governmental
interest); Thayer, 144 F. Supp. 3d at 235; McLaughlin, 140 F. Supp. 3d at 195 (reasoning, “while it
may be more bothersome, and even in some sense more coercive, for a person to be panhandled when
they cannot, or find it difficult to leave, it is not demonstrably more dangerous”).
111. Lakewood v. Willis, 375 P.3d 1056 (Wash. 2016).
112. Kennewick, Wash., Mun. Code § 10.08.120 (repealed 2017); City of Kennewick,
Washington, City Council Meeting, Agenda Item No. 5a (Mar. 7, 2017) [hereinafter Kennewick City
Council Meeting], https://www.go2kennewick.com/AgendaCenter/ViewFile/Agenda/_03072017808 [https://perma.cc/9FRK-FR5M] (recommending that Kennewick City Council repeal its begging
ordinance in its entirety). Like Lakewood’s unconstitutional begging ordinance in Willis, Kennewick’s
ordinance regulated speech based upon the speaker’s purpose (i.e., begging). Id.
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Kennewick City Council staff noted that its municipal code already
“contains other provisions which address public safety concerns but do not
restrict protected speech such as, disorderly conduct, harassment and
assault.”113 Accordingly, absent repealing the ordinance, staff provided no
alternative recommendations.114
A critical comparison between existing criminal laws and antibegging laws illuminates the underlying purpose behind “aggressive
begging” legislation. In short, municipalities have effectively created laws
that target the visibly poor and an unpopular form of speech. Aggressive
panhandling ordinances “hold homeless individuals to a higher standard
than existing assault or harassment laws, which often prohibit the same
conduct but are facially neutral.”115 In an attempt to get around
overbreadth challenges and to survive strict scrutiny, legislatures have
drafted provisions into their aggressive panhandling laws that are
substantially similar to existing assault,116 battery,117 and harassment
laws,118 but within the context of a person asking for help.
113. Kennewick City Council Meeting, supra note 112.
114. Id.
115. For example, as described above, both Seattle and Tacoma include provisions that prohibit
conduct already covered by content-neutral laws. OLSON & MACDONALD, supra note 5, at 4, 17–18
(a comparison between Seattle’s Pedestrian Interference ordinance and its Harassment ordinance
reveals that aggressive panhandling “is nothing more than harassment in the context of a poor person
asking for money”).
116. “To approach, speak or gesture to a person in such a manner as would cause a reasonable
person to feel fearful of safety to their person, another person or property in the person’s possession.”
COVINGTON, WASH., MUN. CODE § 9.190.020(1)(a) (2010). “To approach or speak to a person in such
a manner as would cause a reasonable person to believe that the person is being threatened with either
imminent bodily injury or the commission of a criminal act upon the person or another person or upon
property in the person’s immediate possession.” TACOMA, WASH., MUN. CODE § 8.13.A.020(B)(1)
(2007); PUYALLUP, WASH., MUN. CODE § 9A.08.040, 020(2) (2009). To “approach, speak or gesture
to a person in such a manner as would cause a reasonable person to believe that the person is being
threatened with a commission of a criminal act upon the person, another person or property in the
person’s possession.” ARLINGTON, WASH., MUN. CODE § 9.56.020(6)(A) (2015); CENTRALIA,
WASH., MUN. CODE §§ 10.37.030, .020(B)(1) (2014); ISSAQUAH, WASH., MUN. CODE §
9.45.020(A)(1) (2008); MARYSVILLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 6.37.020(a) (2012); MONROE, WASH.,
MUN. CODE § 9.35.020(A)(1) (2008); OAK HARBOR, WASH., MUN. CODE §§ 6.95.020(2), (2)(a)
(2014). To make “any statement, gesture, or other communication that a reasonable person in the
position of the person solicited would perceive to be a threat or offensive.” LACEY, WASH., MUN.
CODE § 5.21.040(I) (1998) (emphasis added).
117. See, e.g., FEDERAL WAY, WASH., MUN. CODE §§ 6.35.030(2)(a), (1)(e)(v) (2001)
(“evidence of intimidation includes . . . intentionally touching or causing physical contact with another
person without that person’s consent while begging”); KENNEWICK, WASH., MUN. CODE
§ 10.08.120(2)(a) (repealed 2017); KENT, WASH., MUN. CODE §§ 9.02.640(A)(4), (B)(1) (2015);
RENTON, WASH., MUN. CODE § 6.25.1 (2011) (evidence of aggressive begging includes “intentionally
touching or causing physical contact with another person without that person’s consent”).
118. “Behavior that is intended to harass,” where harass is defined as “to create a hostile situation
by uninvited and unwelcome verbal or physical conduct.” BONNEY LAKE, WASH., MUN. CODE
§ 9.11.060(A), (D) (2016). “No person or entity may, when contacting a donor or potential donor for
the purpose of charitable solicitation, engage in any conduct the natural consequence of which is to

308

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 41:249

Tailored to reach truly aggressive behavior, these aggressive begging
provisions may be more likely to survive a constitutional challenge.
However, with duplicative criminal laws that cover the same behavior, it
is important to consider whether municipalities are in fact pursuing the
compelling public safety interest they invoke, rather than disfavoring a
particular message communicated by a particular class of individuals.119
CONCLUSION: THE ETHICAL RESPONSE TO POVERTY AND
HOMELESSNESS
Despite these constitutional and policy concerns, a considerable
amount of anti-panhandling legislation remains on the books. When
tested, vague perception-based laws are unlikely to survive First
Amendment and due process challenges. Sweepingly overbroad time,
manner, and distance restrictions are unlikely to survive strict scrutiny and
First Amendment overbreadth challenges. From a purely legal perspective,
the only aggressive panhandling provisions that might survive
constitutional muster are duplicative of existing, content-neutral laws;
such as assault, battery, and fraud. This is because, although contentbased, cities can argue that the law targets truly harmful behavior, which
serves a compelling public safety interest. However, as noted above, the
only difference from existing content-neutral laws and many of these
provisions is that the panhandling provisions target a particular form of
speech coming from an already vulnerable population.
The logical conclusion is that municipalities have an interest in
removing visible poverty from their cities and people have an interest in
removing the uncomfortable situation of coming face-to-face with a
stranger asking for help. However, in an attempt to solve the underlying
problem of homelessness, it is important to question whether this is the
proper response.
No matter how unsightly and uncomfortable, the ethical, humane
response to poverty and homelessness is to give society a chance to
respond. Hearing and seeing are the tools for change. Listening to the plea
of those who struggle and seeing their plight brings about awareness. The
unethical response is drafting legislation that removes the problem from
sight and earshot by cycling people experiencing homelessness through
the criminal justice system and by enabling discriminatory enforcement.
harass, intimidate, or torment any person in connection with the contact.” SUNNYSIDE, WASH., MUN.
CODE § 5.22.050(E) (2010).
119. See McLaughlin v. City of Lowell, 140 F. Supp. 3d 177, 193 (D. Mass. 2015) (“The City
may not deem criminal activity worse because it is conducted in combination with protected speech,
and it certainly may not do so in order to send a message of public disapproval of that speech on
content based grounds.”).
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In response to the above constitutional and policy issues, legislatures
are encouraged to repeal their aggressive begging laws in their entirety. At
minimum, legislatures should modify their aggressive begging laws by (1)
repealing provisions that provide vague, perception-based components “of
reasonable fear” and “compulsion” that cater to well-established societal
biases and prejudices about the homeless and visibly poor; (2) repealing
any conduct, time, and place provisions that are substantially similar to
provisions that courts have already invalidated as insufficiently tailored to
serve a compelling public safety interest; and (3) repealing any provisions
that restrict conduct already prohibited by existing content-neutral laws.
Because aggressive begging laws are, at their very core, content-based
discriminations on speech, these provisions are unconstitutional
restrictions on speech.

